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DAVID HUTT | PHNOM PENH
Is China truly establishing dominance over neighboring Southeast Asia, or is it a prevailing perception among academics and journalists who have uncritically adopted a pervasive pro–China narrative built on Beijing’s rising investment and influence in the region ?
Two recent Southeast Asian elections denote a shifting spectrum. Last month’s general election in Cambodia, by far China’s most loyal ally in the region, was taken by some as indication of how far the country has moved away from its past Western backers and closer to Beijing.
As Cambodia abandons multi–party democracy for one–party authoritarianism, similar to the dominance of the Communist Party in China, some see Cambodia as the first domino to fall in China’s grand regional ambition for political and economic control over the nearby region.
Indeed, some in Cambodia’s exiled opposition have claimed that the country has become a de facto “Chinese colony” under Prime Minister Hun Sen’s ruling Cambodian People’s Party (CPP).
The Harapan coalition’s win at Malaysia’s May 9 general election, however, pointed in the opposite direction. The long–ruling United Malays National Organisation (UMNO) was ousted by an alliance whose campaign narrative was built in part on opposing Chinese investment, which boomed under the previous government.
Now as prime minister, Mahathir Mohamad has cancelled US$22 billion worth of Chinese–backed infrastructure projects, including a Belt and Road Initiative — inspired high–speed rail line, for reasons of fiscal prudence.
While Mahathir warned of the risk of new forms of “colonialism” during a recently concluded tour of China, he also made the diplomatic point that his government isn’t anti–China.
Cambodia abandons multi–party democracy for one–party authoritarianism, similar to the dominance of the Communist Party in China, some see Cambodia as the first domino to fall in China’s grand regional ambition for political and economic control over the nearby region
“We should always remember that the level of development of countries are not all the same,” Mahathir said this week at a joint press conference with Chinese premier Li Keqiang. “We do not want a situation where there is a new version of colonialism happening because poor countries are unable to compete with rich countries, therefore we need fair trade.”
It is undeniable that China now plays a major and growing role in Southeast Asian affairs, even if judged by only its economic heft.
A recent New York Times report noted that every Asian country now trades more with China than the United States, often by a factor of two to one, an imbalance that is only growing as China’s economic growth outpaces that of America’s.
With China’s economic ascendency projected to continue — the International Monetary Fund (IMF) predicts China could become the world’s largest economy by 2030 — some believe that Beijing aims to replace the US–backed liberal international order in place since the 1950’s with a new less liberal and less orderly model.
Cambodia’s case, however, tests the limits of that forward–looking analysis. The US and European Union (EU) refused to send electoral monitors to Cambodia’s general election last month on the grounds the process was “illegitimate” due to the court–ordered dissolution of the country’s largest opposition party.
Washington has since imposed targeted sanctions on Cambodian officials seen as leading the anti–democratic crackdown, while new legislation now before the US Senate could significantly ramp up the punitive measures.
Hun Sen aired a combative response to threats of sanctions, saying with bravado that he “welcomes” the measures. Some commentators read this as an indication that Phnom Penh no longer cares about the actions and perceptions of democratic nations because it has China’s strong and lucrative backing.
Mahathir warned of the risk of new forms of “colonialism” during a recently concluded tour of China, he also made the diplomatic point that his government isn’t anti–China. But he has cancelled US$22 billion worth of Chinese–backed infrastructure projects, including a Belt and Road Initiative — inspired high–speed rail line, for reasons of fiscal prudence
Yet the CPP still made painstaking efforts to present a veneer of democratic legitimacy on to its rigged elections, something it would not have done if it only cared about Beijing’s opinions. Hun Sen now says he will soon defend the election’s legitimacy at the United Nations General Assembly, yet another indication that he still cares what the West thinks.
China’s rise in Southeast Asia is viewed primarily in relation to the US’ long–standing strong position, both economically and strategically. Many see this competition as a zero–sum game where China’s gain is America’s loss.
Along those lines, some analysts saw US Secretary of State Mike Pompeo’s recent whirlwind trip to Southeast Asia as “parachute diplomacy” that only underscored certain entrenched regional perceptions of the US as an episodic actor that has no real strategy for Southeast Asia.
The Donald Trump administration certainly lacks an overarching policy comparable to his predecessor Barack Obama’s “pivot to Asia,” a much–vaunted scheme with strategic and economic components that made Southeast Asia key to America’s policy of counterbalancing China.
Despite no new policy moniker, Trump’s administration has in many ways continued Obama’s scheme: Vietnam remains a key ally, support for other South China Sea claimants is unbending, military sales remain high, and containing Chinese expansion is still the raison d’etre.
It’s also been seen in the number of visits to Southeast Asia by senior White House officials, including high profile tours by Pompeo and his predecessor Rex Tillerson, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis, and Trump himself to Vietnam in November 2017 and Singapore in June.
A little noticed December 2017 National Security Strategy document, produced by Trump’s White House, explicitly notes that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo–Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state–driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour.”
Yet perceptions of new Cold War–like competition in Southeast Asia often fail to note the imbalance between America and China’s spheres of influence in the region.
China’s two most loyal regional allies are arguably Cambodia and Laos, countries of less economic and strategic importance than America’s main partners Indonesia, Thailand, Singapore and Vietnam.
The historically pro–US Philippines has gravitated somewhat into China’s orbit under President Rodrigo Duterte, though at most there has been an equalisation of its relations between the two powers rather than outright domination by China.
Strategic analyst Richard Javad Heydarian recently noted that Duterte likes to think of himself as a “reincarnation of mid–20th century titans of the Non–Aligned Movement,” though Heydarian suggested that this could prompt a backlash from the Philippine public that remains resolutely pro–America.
Malaysia, another country that was thought to have been moving closer to China, has ricocheted strongly in the other direction after the change in leadership from pro–China Najib Razak to China–skeptic Mahathir Mohamad.
Thailand has boosted military ties with Beijing since the country’s military coup in 2014, which caused some panic in Washington, but a recent incident has shown just how fragile their bilateral relations remain.
After two boats sank near the resort island of Phuket in early July, killing dozens of Chinese tourists, Deputy Prime Minister Prawit Wongsuwan blamed the Chinese tour operators, commenting the accident was “entirely Chinese harming Chinese.”
Meanwhile, have expressed concerns that Laos risks falling into a Chinese “debt trap” via its Beijing–backed US$6 billion high–speed rail project, a claim that Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith felt the need to publicly rebuff
His claim led to calls in China for tourists to boycott Thailand, which could cost the country roughly US$1.5 billion in cancellations, according to some estimates. Thailand’s tourism sector is now facing a major public relations problem after China’s jingoist state–owned media lambasted Prawit’s tactless response.
More explosively, rare nationwide protests in Vietnam in June were sparked by nationalistic concerns that a new law allowing 99–year land leases in special economic zones would effectively sell sovereign territory to China.
There are strong perceptions that Vietnam’s ruling Communist Party is too close to Beijing, a cause of resentment that some analysts suggest is the country’s biggest potential source of instability.
Even in perceived pro–China nations like Cambodia and Laos, anti–China sentiment is rising in certain sections of the public. Arguments that Chinese investment actually harms the livelihoods of many Cambodians, especially in places like coastal Sihanoukville and Koh Kong, is on the ascendency.
Criticism has centred on a concession deal the Cambodian government entered with a Chinese company that effectively gives it land rights to an estimated 20% of Cambodia’s coastline.
The same goes for Laos’ ruling communist party, which has taken steps to curb the growth of certain sectors dominated by Chinese investment, such as banana plantations and mining, over public complaints about their adverse health and environmental impacts.
The IMF and others, meanwhile, have expressed concerns that Laos risks falling into a Chinese “debt trap” via its Beijing–backed US$6 billion high–speed rail project, a claim that Prime Minister Thongloun Sisoulith felt the need to publicly rebuff in June.
Still, there is a certain misapprehension that China’s rising economic importance to the region, both as a provider of aid and investment and market for exports, necessarily equates to strong political and strategic influence.
It doesn’t always add up that way. In January, China fractionally overtook America as the largest importer of Vietnamese goods, according to the General Department of Vietnam Customs. Nonetheless, Hanoi remains decidedly pro–US in regional affairs and that position isn’t expected to change, even if its exports to China continue to outpace those to America.
More fundamentally, China’s rising economic presence in the region is in many instances destabilising relations. Rapid growth in Chinese investment to Malaysia in recent years prompted a public backlash, a phenomena seized on by the victorious Harapan coalition.
There are incipient signs the same type of backlash is now percolating in Cambodia and Laos.
Chinese investment is likely to play a role in Indonesia’s presidential and legislative elections next year, perhaps negatively for incumbent President Joko Widodo, under whose tenure China has become the country’s third largest investor.
“The relationship with China could turn toxic for [Widodo],” Keith Loveard, senior analyst with Jakarta–based business risk firm Concord Consulting, recently told.
To be sure, China has translated some of its economic largesse to strategic advantage. Philippine President Durterte, for example, said in October 2016 that his country’s one–way security ties with the US would come to an end, though America’s provision of “technical assistance” during the Marawi City siege last year cast the extent of that into doubt.
China has also developed closer ties to the militaries of Thailand and Cambodia, so much so that the latter cancelled joint military exercises with the US last year. It has also resumed its past position of shielding Myanmar’s generals from Western condemnation during the recent Rohingya refugee crisis.
National Security Strategy document, produced by Trump’s White House, explicitly notes that “China seeks to displace the United States in the Indo–Pacific region, expand the reaches of its state–driven economic model, and reorder the region in its favour
But America still remains the predominant security ally of most Southeast Asian nations, something that will only become more important as concerns about the spread of Islamic terrorism heighten. This month, Washington provided an additional US$300m in security funding to the region.
Only Laos, Cambodia and Myanmar buy more arms from China than America, according to the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. The rest of Southeast Asia’s military procurements, sometimes exclusively, come from the US.
Still, some of China’s recent regional successes have been the result of America’s missteps. China has been greatly helped by Trump’s withdrawal of America from its long–standing leadership role in certain multilateral institutions, as well as his ad hoc policy towards Southeast Asia that favours more bilateralism.
Had Trump not withdrawn the US from the Trans–Pacific Partnership, a multilateral trade deal championed by Obama that excludes China, regional trade flows would be geared more towards America, providing an important counterbalance to many regional countries’ rising dependence on Chinese markets.
By doing so, Trump allowed Beijing’s multilateral economic institutions, like the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank and the New Development Bank, to gain an upper hand.
Yet most reporting on China’s influence in Southeast Asia rests on the assumption that the trends of the past decade will continue into the future. But it’s not clear that Chinese investment will keep growing at the same rate — or even faster — while America continues to fumble over how best to engage with Southeast Asia.
China cannot rule out that in 2021 America could have a new president able to articulate and implement a more coherent policy towards Southeast Asia, nor that upcoming elections in Indonesia and possibly even Myanmar see the rise of anti–China candidates.
Explore the evolving U.S.-China relationship in this timeline: https://t.co/LDJKesraAL
— CFR (@CFR_org) September 10, 2018
Neither can Beijing rule out that India won’t become a major player in the region, despite it so far failing to live up to expectations. A recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations, a US–based think tank, asserted that it can be “a more forceful counterweight to China and hedge against a declining United States.”
Moreover, there is great uncertainty over whether the South China Sea disputes pitting China versus the Philippines, Malaysia and Vietnam, among others, might at some point turn hot, which would significantly alter the region’s security approach in place since the 1990s.
China’s growing trade war with the US could also impact on its relations with the region. Some believe China could soon devalue its currency in response to the US–China trade war, though Beijing says it won’t.
Not only would a devalued renminbi make Chinese–made products cheaper, negatively affecting competing Southeast Asian exporters, it would also affect the region’s supply chains as Chinese buyers would be expected to demand cheaper prices. Few, if any, in the region would win from rounds of competitive currency devaluations.
But viewing China’s power in the region vis–a–vis America’s is only part of the picture. Japan, and to a lesser extent South Korea, are also major players and potential counterweights to China.
Since the 2000s, Japan’s infrastructure investment in the region has been worth US$230 billion, while China’s was about US$155 billion, according to recent BMI Research, an economic research outfit. The balance might tip in China’s favour with the US$1 trillion Belt and Road Initiative, but probably not for another decade or so, BMI projects.
Tokyo rarely boasts of its own soft power in Southeast Asia. Indeed, while Philippine leader Duterte’s overtures to China are among his major talking points, quietly it has been Japan, not China, that is funding his government’s ballyhooed major infrastructure programs.
Japanese diplomacy towards the region falls somewhere between China and America’s. While Washington’s, at least past, insistence on human rights and democracy-building puts off to many regional countries, Beijing’s diplomacy is more laissez faire, as long as Chinese interests are protected by sitting governments.
Tokyo, by contrast, tends to practice quiet sustained diplomacy, decidedly in support of rule of law but without the threat of punitive measures if a partner government strays. That is likely one reason why there is little anti–Japan sentiment in the region and why its relations receive much less public attention.
Malaysia’s Mahathir, whose first trip abroad after May’s election win was to Tokyo, not Beijing or Washington, has recently spoken of Japan’s importance in regional affairs.
America still remains the predominant security ally of most Southeast Asian nations, something that will only become more important as concerns about the spread of Islamic terrorism heighten. This month, Washington provided an additional US$300m in security funding to the region
Mahathir shaped Southeast Asia’s approach to great powers during his previous tenure as prime minister from 1981–2003, and his belief that Japan can play an even larger role in regional affairs could soon be taken up by other regional governments.
“Specific Southeast Asian states are now seeking to diversify their strategic partnerships, beyond a binary choice between Beijing and Washington,” reads a recent report by the Council on Foreign Relations.
Mahathir’s apparent desire is for a more diversified regional network, similar to the hedging policies he promoted in the 1990s. Mahathir is certainly not pro–China, but neither is he pro–US.
What most Southeast Asian nations desire is not unipolarity but competition among many foreign partners that allows them to maximise benefits and negotiating leverage. When America and China, or Japan and India, compete to gain an economic and political footing, regional nations often win through the bidding. ■
—LOOKEAST is not responsible for the opinions, facts or any media content presented by contributors. We are reproducing an AsiaTimes reportage.